Abstract. We introduce the concept of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) schemes, give precise definitions of their security and mention some applications. A two-level HIBE (2-HIBE) scheme consists of a root private key generator (PKG), domain PKGs and users, all of which are associated with primitive IDs (PIDs) that are arbitrary strings. A user's public key consists of their PID and their domain's PID (in whole called an address). In a regular IBE (which corresponds to a 1-HIBE) scheme, there is only one PKG that distributes private keys to each user (whose public keys are their PID). In a 2-HIBE, users retrieve their private key from their domain PKG. Domain PKGs can compute the private key of any user in their domain, provided they have previously requested their domain secret key from the root PKG (who possesses a master secret). We can go beyond two levels by adding subdomains, subsubdomains, and so on. We present a two-level system with total collusion resistance at the upper (domain) level and partial collusion resistance at the lower (user) level, which has chosen-ciphertext security in the random-oracle model.
Introduction
Shamir asked for an identity-based encryption (IBE) cryptosystem in 1984 [9] , but a fully-functional IBE scheme was not found until recent work by Boneh and Franklin [1] and Cocks [4] . Recall that an IBE scheme is a public-key cryptosystem where any arbitrary string is a valid public key. The corresponding private keys must be computed by a trusted third party called the private key generator (PKG) (who possesses a master secret). Users of the system request their private key from the PKG.
We note that the public key infrastructure associated with standard publickey cryptosystems also includes a trusted third party (in the form of a root certificate authority) and allows a hierarchy of certificate authorities [12] : the root certificate authority can issue certificates for other certificate authorities, who in turn can issue certificates for users in their respective domains.
The original system of Boneh and Franklin does not allow for such structure. However, a hierarchy of PKGs is desirable in an IBE system, as it greatly reduces the workload on master server(s) and allows key escrow at several levels. For instance, if the users of the system are employees of corporations, then it is natural to want each corporation to be able to generate the private keys for their employees, so that employees request their keys from their corporation, rather than the top-level PKG. Only corporations request their domain secret (and only once per corporation) from the top-level PKG. This is the idea behind a hierarchical IBE (HIBE) system. In particular, this is an example of a two-level HIBE (2-HIBE) scheme. (The advantage of an HIBE system over standard PKI is that senders can derive the recipient's public key from their address without an online lookup.)
More precisely, there are three types of entities in a 2-HIBE scheme. There is the root PKG, who possesses a master key. In the upper level, there are domain PKGs, who can request their domain key from the root PKG. Lastly, there are users, who can request private keys from their domain PKG. Each user and each domain has a primitive ID (PID), which is an arbitrary string. (If Alice works for Company.com and her email address is alice@company.com, her PID is alice and her company's PID is company.com.) The public key of a user consists of a tuple of PIDs: the PID of the user and the PID of the user's domain (this public key is also called the user's address) and, as with IBE systems, it is clear that a sender can derive the receiver's public key offline. We can generalize to HIBE schemes with more levels by allowing subdomains, subsubdomains, and so on.
Another application for HIBE systems is generating short-lived keys for portable computing devices. Suppose Alice is planning to embark on a weeklong business trip and wants to be able read her encrypted mail while on the road. However, she is also worried that her laptop may be stolen or otherwise compromised, so she does not want to simply copy her private key to the laptop. This dilemma is readily solved with a 2-HIBE system: this time, the upper level consists of people, such as Alice, and the lower level consists of dates, and when an arbitrary user Bob wants to send a message to Alice he uses the tuple of Alice's PID and the PID for the current date as her address. Alice can generate (for example) seven days' worth of keys (from her private key that she has previously requested from a PKG) and transfer these to her laptop. Now if the laptop is compromised, the damage is limited. We note that collusion at the bottom level is not an issue, as Alice will only put a small number of keys on her laptop. This problem can also be solved with a standard (non-hierarchical) IBE scheme by having Alice run her own IBE system [1] , but in this case Bob must get Alice's system parameters before he can communicate with her.
In this paper, we give formal security definitions that can model plausible real-life attack scenarios on HIBE systems. In addition to chosen-ciphertext attacks, we must also worry about attacks involving collusion by entities on arbitrary levels. In our example above, for instance, if the domain PKG of one corporation A colludes with employees of another corporation B, they should not be able to decrypt messages of other employees of corporation B (or of any other corporation C, for that matter). In general, an adversary should not be able to decrypt a message encrypted for a particular user in a particular domain (and subdomain, subsubdomain, etc.), even if they have access to the private key of every other user and of every other domain (and subdomain, subsubdomain, etc.), in addition to information obtained from a decryption oracle.
We present a 2-HIBE scheme with total collusion resistance at the upper level and partial collusion resistance at the lower level. (This limitation does not affect its applicability to the above laptop example.) In terms of the corporate setting, even if an arbitrary number of corporations collude, the master secret is safe, but, at the lower level, if more than certain number of employees of a corporation C collude, they can expose C's private key.
Our system requires a bilinear map with certain properties. A suitable map can constructed from the Weil pairing (which is described in [1] ). Its performance is sufficiently fast for practical purposes, provided the number of colluding parties allowed in the lower level is not too large. (Its running time and key size involve a term linear in this number.) Additionally, we can employ the same techniques used with the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme to split secrets across several servers and achieve robustness for free.
Definitions
An identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) is specified by four randomized algorithms: Setup, KeyGen (called Extract in [1] ), Encrypt, and Decrypt. In brief, Setup generates system parameters that are publicly released and a master key that is given to the PKG only; KeyGen is run by the PKG to generate private keys corresponding to a given primitive ID (PID); Encrypt encrypts a message using a given PID (PIDs are public keys); and Decrypt decrypts a ciphertext given a private key. We shall always take the message space to be M = {0, 1} m . These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, namely, when d is the private key generated by algorithm KeyGen when it is given the PID A as the public key, then
These algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, namely, when d is the private key generated by algorithm KeyGen when it is given the address N as the public key, then
where C = Encrypt(params, N, M ).
Remark 1. For certain values of , an HIBE is the same as other familiar structures:
-When = 0, this definition captures the essence of public-key encryption schemes: the level-0 key corresponds to a private key and the params correspond to the public key (the address is empty when calling Encrypt; each system is associated with only one private key/public key pair). -When = 1, we have a definition of a standard IBE.
Security
In order to cover realistic attacks, we assume that an attacker may be able obtain private keys at any level except for the master secret, and extend the standard model of chosen-ciphertext security accordingly. We note that if the master secret is compromised, the effects are at least as disastrous as when the root certificate authority is compromised in a public-key cryptosystem. Thus we assume that the precautions taken to guard the master secret are similar to those taken to guard a root certificate authority in real life (e.g., secret splitting, tamper-resistant hardware), rendering it unassailable. Consider the following game played by two parties, an adversary and a challenger:
2. The adversary submits any number of decryption and/or key-generation queries adaptively (i.e., each query may depend on the replies to previous queries). In a decryption query, the adversary sends a ciphertext and an address and is given the corresponding plaintext under the unique key associated with that address (assuming the ciphertext and address are valid). For a key-generation query, the adversary submits any prefix address S 1 , . . . , S i (for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ), and is told the output K i (where K j is defined to be
. . , S j ) for 0 < j ≤ i and K 0 is the key returned by Setup).
In other words, not only can the adversary learn the decryption of any chosen ciphertext, it can also obtain the key corresponding to any prefix address. 3. The adversary then outputs any two plaintexts M 0 , M 1 ∈ M and any address N on which it wishes to be challenged, subject to the restriction that no prefix of N has been queried in the previous step. We call such an adversary an ID-CCA attacker. Finding even a 2-HIBE that satisfies this security requirement remains an open problem. We describe a 2-HIBE that is secure provided the adversary is limited to n KeyGen 2 queries within its domain (for a given n; unlimited KeyGen 1 queries are allowed). In other words, our system resists arbitrary collusion at the domain level, but resists only limited collusion at the user level.
We will also utilize a weaker notion of security in intermediate steps of our proofs. Consider another game played by two parties, an adversary and a challenger:
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm (for a given security parameter k) and gives params to the adversary. 2. The adversary submits some number of key-generation queries adaptively, that is, for each query, the adversary submits any prefix address S 1 , . . . , S i (for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ), and is told the output K i (where K j is defined to be KeyGen j (K j−1 , S 1 , . . . , S j ) for 0 < j ≤ i and K 0 is the key returned by Setup).
3. The adversary then outputs any address N on which it wishes to be challenged, subject to the restriction that no prefix of N has been queried in the previous step. 4. The challenger picks a message M ∈ M randomly and computes C = Encrypt(params, N, M ). It sends the challenge C to the adversary. 5. The adversary again issues some number of key-generation queries adaptively, except that it now may not ask for the key corresponding to any prefix of N . 6. The adversary outputs some message M ∈ M, and wins if M = M .
We call such an adversary an ID-OWE attacker. Definition 6. We define an HIBE to be a one-way identity-based encryption scheme (ID-OWE) if no polynomially-bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
Both these definitions are generalizations of definitions given by Boneh and Franklin [1] .
An HIBE Resistant against Domain Collusion
We present a two-level system resistant to collusion at the domain level. The system is based on bilinear forms between two prime-order groups.
The BDH Assumption
We briefly review definitions given by Boneh For the remainder of the paper we make use of some fixed BDH parameter generator IG that satisfies the BDH assumption, and use the symbols G 1 , G 2 , e, q to represent the constituents of its output. Boneh and Franklin [1] also give details on how to implement such a generator (their system also required one), based on the Weil pairing. (In their construction, G 1 is a group of points on a certain elliptic curve and G 2 is a certain subgroup of F × p 2 , for some prime p.) This assumption was implicitly used by Joux [7] to build a one-round threeparty Diffie-Hellman protocol. Other constructions also require the BDH assumption ( [8, 10, 11] ). Additionally, a bilinear function is needed in a recently described short signature scheme [3] .
A Game Transformation
The BDH assumption is closely tied to the CDH assumption. Recall that the CDH problem asks for g ab given g, g a , g b , whereas the goal in the CDH problem is to compute e(g, g)
b . This similarity between the BDH and CDH assumptions naturally leads to the following transformation on games:
Definition 11. Using the notation of the previous section, suppose G is a game where the goal of the adversary is to compute a particular element g ∈ G 1 . Then the e-transformation of G is the same game as G except now the adversary is also given a random h ∈ G 1 and the adversary's goal is to compute e(g, h).
We can transform assumptions by applying this transformation to the underlying game. For example, we obtain the BDH assumption (associated with a particular e) when we apply this transformation to the CDH assumption.
It is possible to formulate our assumptions differently: we could have started with assuming that e is a bilinear function such that if a game G is hard then its e-transformation is also hard. This would simplify our exposition (for example, we need only assume the CDH problem is hard, as that implies that the BDH problem is hard). However, such an assumption is really an abstract description of a class of assumptions, and we prefer the readability gained by relying on a small number of concrete assumptions instead.
Clearly, if an adversary can win a game G, then it can easily win the etransformation of G. The converse is far from clear.
We shall see that transformed assumptions are required to show that schemes are ID-OWE; without transformation, the assumptions are more natural, but we can only show that an adversary cannot recover a user's private key.
Linear e-One-Way Functions
We now build up to the definition of a linear e-one-way function, from which one could build an HIBE. We then construct a function that is weaker than eone-way that will allow for efficiently building a 2-HIBE which is secure against any collusion at the domain level and limited collusion at the user level.
Suppose that we have a function h: G × X → G 1 , where G and G 1 are groups, G is of prime order p, X is a set, and h(g The elements x, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ∈ X, a ∈ F p , and a generator g ∈ G are chosen at random. Given x, g, and
) is called the linear one-way problem (of size n). g 1 ). Now, f g is one-way, assuming DDH is hard in G 2 . To see this, assume that f g is easy to invert; DDH in G 2 can be solved as follows: given x, x a , x b , x c ∈ G 2 we find their inverses y, y a , y b , y c respectively, and check if e(y, y c ) = e(y a , y b ). We note that if IG is constructed as described by Boneh and Franklin, then G 2 is a subgroup of F × p 2 , a group in which DDH is thought to be hard. (It is also possible to construct elliptic curves where the q-torsion points are contained in F p for some large prime q. Inverting the Weil pairing on these curves is equivalent to breaking DDH in F p .) More generally, this is why the relationship between a game and its e-transform appears to be highly nontrivial: if an algorithm A could win a game G, given an algorithm B that wins the e-transform of G, then A is an algorithm that can invert f g .
Now suppose that (G
Then the e-transformation of the linear one-way problem is called the linear e-one-way problem. (In this problem, we are also given g r for some random r ∈ F p (in addition to x, g, and KeyGen 1 : Input: a prefix address S (the domain name). Output:
KeyGen 2 : Input: an address S, T (S is the domain PID and T is the user PID).
Let mk S ∈ G 1 be the domain key.
Encrypt: Input: params, N = S, T (S is the recipient domain's PID and T is the recipient user's PID), and M . Pick a random r ∈ F q . Output:
Decrypt: Input: params, N = S, T , a ciphertext C = g r , V , and a user's private key k :
It can be shown that this scheme is ID-OWE. By applying the FujisakiOkamoto [6] transformation, we obtain a scheme which is ID-CCA. Though finding a linear e-one-way function h remains an open problem, we are able to construct an h such that the linear e-one-way problem for a fixed n is hard, giving rise to a 2-HIBE system that is resistant to (unlimited) domain-level collusion and can tolerate up to n-party user-level collusion. We describe this in the following section. Briefly, we will define h: G n+1 1 × F q → G 1 (for some n; q is the prime order of G 1 ) as h ((g 0 , g 1 , . .
. We then have a linear function h such that, given g and n pairs x i , h(g, x i ) , it appears hard to determine x , h(g, x ) for any other x .
Our Domain-Collusion Resistant Scheme
Let n denote the amount of collusion that we are willing to tolerate at the user level.
Setup: Input: k ∈ Z. Run IG 1 k and set (G 1 , G 2 , e) to be the output. Choose a random a ∈ F q and a random g ∈ G 1 . Pick cryptographically-strong hash functions , when U = g r .
Proof of Security
Recall that we are restricting the adversary to at most n KeyGen 2 queries from the same domain. Proof. The proof of the theorem is broken into several lemmata. In Lemma 1, we show that an attacker B, whose KeyGen queries are restricted to only KeyGen 2 queries from the same domain as the challenge address, is essentially as strong as an arbitrary attacker A. We do so in a manner similar to that used in the analysis of the Boneh-Franklin scheme [1] , which is itself partly based on a technique of Coron [5] . In Lemma 2, we define the Bilinear Polynomial DiffieHellman (BPDH) game, and give a reduction from the attack by the B described above to an attack by (an attacker) C on the BPDH game. Lastly we produce a reduction from an attack by C on the BPDH game to an attack by D on the BDH problem. The combination of the three lemmata leads immediately to the theorem. 
Lemma 1. Suppose there exists an ID-OWE attacker

